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316 abstract
In this work we analyze the effects of the 2015 reform of the Spanish personal in-
come tax (PIT) on tax revenue, liquidity, redistribution, progressivity, and poverty, 
using microdata. Tax reform has increased the redistributive effect. The applica-
ble legislation in 2016 is almost 6.3% more redistributive than that in 2011, as 
measured by the Reynolds-Smolensky index. This is a remarkable achievement 
since greater redistribution has been attained through significantly lower tax rev-
enue. The 2016 legislation has produced 4.4% lower tax revenue, but progressiv-
ity, as measured by Kakwani index, has increased by 12.2% from the 2011 legisla-
tion. The redistributive and progressivity analysis has been conducted with the use 
of microsimulation tools developed in the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (IEF), in 
Spain. The poverty analysis is made using EUROMOD, a tax-benefit microsimu-
lation model for the European Union. 
Keywords: personal income distribution, inequality, redistributive taxation, 
microsimulation, progressivity
1 IntroductIon
Spain has undertaken a reform of its personal income tax (PIT), which became ap-
plicable in 2016. The reform consists of a set of measures that affect the different 
components of the tax to a greater or lesser extent. Among these is a decrease of the 
tax rates in the tax schedule, which especially benefited lower income tax-payers. In 
addition, the threshold of taxation was raised, the limit to the exemption of sever-
ance pay was extended, and the reduction for labour income was substituted for by 
a fixed amount for deduction of expenses. Tax rates on income from savings are also 
raised while other measures were introduced to promote saving in the long term. 
There is an increase in personal and family minimums and new deductions are in-
troduced. The new deductions – like those already existing for working mothers 
with children under three years old can operate as negative taxes for families with 
ascendants and descendants with disabilities, as well as for large families.
In this work, we analyze the effects of the 2015 reform of the Spanish personal 
income tax on tax revenue, liquidity, redistributive and progressive effects and 
poverty, using microdata. The tax reform increases the redistributive effect. The 
applicable legislation in 2016 is almost 6.3% more redistributive than that of 
2011, as measured by the Reynolds-Smolensky index. This is a remarkable 
achievement since the greater redistribution effect has been attained by signifi-
cantly lower tax revenue. The 2016 legislation has resulted in 4.4% lower tax 
revenue, but progressivity, as measured by the Kakwani index, has increased by 
12.2% in comparison to the 2011 legislation. The redistributive and progressivity 
analysis has been conducted with the use of microsimulation tools developed in 
the IEF. The poverty analysis was conducted with the use of EUROMOD -version 
G2.1 (Sutherland and Figari, 2013).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the changes introduced by 
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317amount and distribution of the increase in liquidity. Section 4 shows the effects on 
revenue, redistribution and progressivity generated by the reform, while section 5 
is devoted to revealing their effects on poverty. Section 6 concludes.
2 MaIn eleMents of tHe 2015 reforM
To understand what the effects of the reform have been, it is necessary to know 
what the main changes that have occurred in the regulation of Spanish PIT are. 
The changes that have been put in place following the 2015 reform could be sum-
marized as follows:
1) New tax schedule: both the number of brackets and the marginal rates ap-
plicable thereto are reduced.
2) Reduction in withholding tax rates.
3) Labour income can be reduced by 2,000€ for other expenses, and there are 
changes in the reduction for obtaining this kind of income.
4) A reduction of 30% instead of 40% will be applied for yields generated 
over a period of more than 2 years, or obtained irregularly.
5) Family taxation: the personal minimum amount is raised as is that relating 
to descendants or ascendants that live with the taxpayer.
6) New tax credits for taxpayers with higher family burdens, such as those 
who work outside, large families or with people with disabilities under 
their charge may deduct fees for care up to of 1,200€ per year. Possibility 
of early collection.
7) To improve investment and stimulate savings, a new tax schedule applica-
ble to the base of savings in which the marginal rates of each tranche are 
reduced; Creation of Long Term Savings Plan.
8) Reductions in the limits of annual contributions to pension plans and those 
made in favour of a spouse.
9) Incentive to patronage.
The reform has been implemented via a transitional period, so we present infor-
mation about the tax rules for 2015 (transitional) and 2016 (definitive). The main 
changes in the regulations in the PIT reform of 2015 are described in more detail 
in the appendix.
3 effects of tHe reforM on lIQuIdItY
The reform we analyzed had a positive effect of liquidity in favour of taxpayers. 
By “liquidity”, we understand a greater availability of resources in the hands of 
the taxpayers. This means there is more money available, which is generated in 
two ways: on the one hand, through the types of retention, on the other, by the so-
called negative deductions, which can be requested in advance payment. Our ob-
jective is to determine the extent to which liquidity has increased to the benefit of 
the taxpayers, using quantification for this purpose from: 
 – microdata (global magnitude of increase in liquidity, which may be sub- 
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318  – the analysis of certain types of case (which family groups are those that per-
ceive higher increases in liquidity, classified by family circumstances [num-
ber of children and level of dependency] and by the level of complete in-
come that they obtain).
We used the most recently available data at the moment of calculation, corre-
sponding to the 2011 Survey of Living Conditions. From the income distribution 
of  2011, we can obtain, by applying the basic regulations on withholdings of 
2014, a theoretical reference framework. This scenario is compared with the ap-
plication of the regulations of year 2015 and 2016 to the same data base. This 
means that the distributive structure of income is the same – marked by what hap-
pened in 2011 – and this distribution is applied before and after the reform. Thus, 
all the changes are due to the fact that a differentiated regulation is applied, with-
out considering any change in the distribution of data (therefore, it does not in-
clude answers on the part of the taxpayer to the fiscal changes).
The microdata used affect the group of respondents because the information de-
rived from the exploitation of retention models is not available. This leaves out an 
analysis of a large group of taxpayers who will also benefit from the reduction of 
withholdings, especially those whose labour income does not exceed 12,000€ per 
year, since, after the reform, they will not be subject to withholding.
According to the Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, it is estimated 
that as of January 2015, 750,000 employees are fully paid their wages because no 
type of withholding is applied.
The results derived from the application of the reformed withholding rates are 
showed in table 1.
Table 1
Withholdings calculated by different sources of income 2014-2016 (in mn euro)
source of income withholdings 2014 2015 2016
Labour income 65,707 61,645 58,888
Income from capital  4,896  4,663  4,430
Leases of urban real estate  1,543  1,470  1,396
Economic activities  3,589  3,418  3,247
Capital gains 325 310 294
Total 76,060 71,505 68,255
Source: Authors’ calculation using Spanish Tax Agency data.
Liquidity has increased in all cases, for all sources of income and for all tranches. 
The percentage increase in liquidity (reduction of retentions in relation to the 
amount withheld prior to the reform) occurs in inverse proportion to the level of 
labour income obtained. The largest increase in the volume of liquidity is concen-
trated in the labour income, since this represents the greatest weight in the set of 
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319The absolute increase in liquidity is calculated as the difference between the 
amounts retained in 2014 and in the years 2015 and 2016.
Table 2 
Absolute increase in liquidity by income sources (in mn euro)
source of income withholdings 2015 vs. 2014 2016 vs. 2014
Labour income 4,062 6,819
Income from capital 233 466
Leases of urban real estate 73 147
Economic activities 171 342
Capital gains 15 31
Total 4,555 7,805
Source: Authors’ calculation using Spanish Tax Agency data.
If we compare the liquidity increase per decile, the result is always a decreasing 
effect as the level of income increases. In the first four deciles, the accumulated 
liquidity increase in 2016 is 66.28%, in the 5th decile it is 29.64%, reducing to al-
most 8% in the last two deciles in which the differences between the two deciles 
is only slightly appreciable. 
graph 1
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2016 vs. 2014
Source: Authors’ calculation using Spanish Tax Agency data.
The effects of increased liquidity depend on the amount of income, the source 
from which it comes, family circumstances, and the option for individual or joint 
declaration (in the case of an individual declaration, half the related benefits to the 
descendants). The percentage increase in liquidity is calculated by comparing the 
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320 retained in 2014. The increases in liquidity were calculated applying the transi-
tional regulations of 2015, and the conclusions are the same as those obtained for 
2016. For that reason, we present the increases of liquidity according to income 
level and family circumstances exclusively for the year 2016.
Differences in family needs have been considered by including families without 
children and up to three children, as well as two children in which one of them 
suffers from a disability of more than 33% or 65%. Thus, moving to the right in 
the tables shows greater need, just as moving from bottom to top, shows a lower 
income level. The comparison between 2014 and 2016 yields these results for in-
dividual taxation.
Table 3
Percentage increase in liquidity by income level and family circumstances, 
individual taxation, 2016-2014











2 chi. 1  
disab > 33%
2 chi 1  
disa > 65%
 12,000 100 100
 15,000  23  27 34 158 215
 20,000  14  15 17  51  81 153
 25,000  12  13 14  33  52  74
 30,000   9   9 10  23  36  46
100,000   7   7  7   9  11  11
150,000   7   7  7   8   9   9
Note: The last two columns (6 and 7) refer to families with two children, one of them with a level 
of disability greater than 33% or 65%, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculation using Spanish Tax Agency data.
An increase in liquidity is equivalent to a reduction in retained amounts. If the 
percentage of increase of liquidity is of 100%, it means that the retention is half of 
that in 2014. When the percentages are well above 100%, the effect of the antici-
pated collection of the negative deductions appears.
The liquidity increases in any case, for all levels of income, regardless of family 
circumstances, and for the options of both individual and joint declaration. The 
results on liquidity increase show the highest values in the top and right positions 
of tables 3 and 4, which indicates that the treatment of lower withholdings is more 
beneficial to the families that have the greatest need, either by income level or by 
family circumstances. This result occurs in the transitional year and in the defini-
tive year, and whichever tax option is chosen, individual or joint. Comparing the 
results of tables 3 and 4 it can be seen that the joint declaration option shows in-
creases of greater significance than the individual declaration option. The inclu-
sion of differences not due to income but to family circumstances is introduced by 
privileging families who, for the same level of income, have a higher level of need 
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321Table 4 
Percentage increase in liquidity by income level and family circumstances, joint 
taxation, 2016-2014











2 chi. 1  
disab > 33%
2 chi 1  
disa > 65%
 12,000
 15,000 22 77
 20,000 18 24 39 826
 25,000 12 15 19 134 191
 30,000 11 12 14  65 103 317
 75,000  9  9  9  16  22  27
100,000  7  7  7  11  15  18
150,000  7  7  7   9  11  13
Note: The last two columns (6 and 7) refer to families with two children, one of them with a level 
of disability greater than 33% or 65%, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculation using Spanish Tax Agency data.
4  effects of tHe reforM on reVenue, ProGressIVItY and 
redIstrIbutIon
In this section, we conduct an analysis of the effects of normative changes of the 
Spanish Personal Income Tax between 2011 and 2016. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, the effects on revenue, distribution and progressivity generated by the 
reform have been calculated using the personal income tax microsimulation tool 
developed by the Spanish Institute for Fiscal Studies (in Spanish: IEF, Instituto de 
Estudios Fiscales). Poverty measurement is carried out using EUROMOD.
The explanation for the use of these two different tools is based on the better fit of 
the data used for each purpose: whereas the redistributive analysis is based on the 
panel of tax filers provided by the State Tax Administration Agency with very rich 
information in terms of PIT, the poverty analysis comes from data provided by the 
Living Conditions Survey, which represents the left side of the distribution of in-
come better.
The reference is the income declared in 2011. The regulations used for compari-
son are those in force in 2011 and those approved for 2016. The reason for using 
the legislation approved for 2016, is that it constitutes the final, and not a transi-
tional, tax reform. On the other hand, the 2011 regulations have been prioritized 
with respect to 2014 in order to avoid distortions in the results derived from the 
temporary application of the complementary tax schedule. 
We calculate the effects on the redistribution and progressivity achieved by the re-
form by comparing the distribution of income before and after taxes. However, we 
are interested not only in the total effect, but also in the achievements of different 
elements, so it will be useful to define the different income concepts relevant to the 
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322 Pre-tax income is the most accurate approximation to the taxpayer’s true in-
come (i.e. in the absence of taxes) that can be obtained from the administrative 
data.
The income net of taxes refers to the amount left to the taxpayers after they 
have submitted the taxable base to tax of tariff and all the deductions except 
those that can turn the quota into negative have been considered. In other 
words, the deduction for maternity leave and the new negative taxes are left 
out. The result of this income net of taxes, in addition to the changes in the 
configuration of taxable base, will make it possible to show the changes in the 
tax collection capacity.
The final net income adds to the previous concept all those deductions that 
operate as negative taxes. This variable will be higher in value to the income 
net of taxes as a consequence of the application of the new negative taxes. This 
differentiation of income is advisable because it allows us to analyze in an 
isolated way the effects on redistribution of new negative taxes.
Table 5 
Absolute and relative percentage differences on tax revenue and final net income 
between the pre- and post-reform periods (mn euro)
tax revenue final net income
2011 65,485 411,191
2016 62,606 414,070
Absolute difference  -2,878  -2,878
Percentage difference      -4.4      0.7
Source: Authors’ calculation using PIT microsimulation tool developed at the IEF.
As shown in table 5, the reform produced a revenue loss of nearly 2,878€ million, 
which means a 4.4% decrease for the Tax Authorities from the tax collected in 
2011, and an increase of 0.7% on taxpayers’ net income. 
Before redistribution analysis is conducted, it is convenient to remember (Lam-
bert, 1996) that the Reynolds-Smolensky index of redistribution can be obtained 
as the difference between the Gini coefficients of pre-tax and post-tax income, or 
alternatively, from the consideration of the Kakwani index, weighted by the effect 
of the effective average rate effective and discounting the reranking effect.
Thus, the Reynolds-Smolensky index (RS) is obtained as follows:
 RS = G(pre-tax) – G(post-tax) (1)
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323Where t is the average tax rate, K is the Kakwani measure of progressivity and R 
is the reranking effect (Kakwani, 1984).
The effects on redistribution are summarized in tables 6 and 7, for the income net 
of tax and final net income, which differ in the fact that the second concept in-
cludes negative tax deductions.
Table 6
Effects on redistribution, progressivity and revenue of PIT in 2011
results 2011 Income net of tax final net income
Gini (pre-tax income) 0.42343 0.42318
Gini (after-tax income) 0.37998 0.37953
reynolds-smolensky 0.04345 0.04390
Concentration index (tax) 0.69717 0.70444
Concentration index (after-tax income) 0.37923 0.37868
reranking effect 0.00075 0.00085
Effective average tax rate (t) 0.13901 0.13738
Revenue effect [t/(1-t)] 0.16146 0.15926
Kakwani index 0.27374 0.28101
Note: The values that have been used to obtain the Reynolds-Smolensky index have been given 
in bold.
Source: Authors’ calculation using PIT microsimulation tool developed at the IEF.
As can be seen, the pre-reform income tax was progressive (Kakwani index is 
0.27374) and achieved the redistribution of income (Reynolds-Smolensky index 
0.04345), with an average rate of 13.7%. The effects are more pronounced when 
the negative deduction is taken into account (total net income instead of net of tax 
income) with a Reynolds-Smolensky index value of 0.04390 and Kakwani index 
value of 0.28101.
It can be concluded that the 2015 reform results in greater progressivity and redis-
tribution than pre-reform legislation. Moreover, the effect is intensified when the 
negative deductions are considered, since these are more generous since the re-
form. The Kawani index is greater than before (0.295876 or 0.3152 including 
negative tax deductions), and the Reynolds-Smolensky index being higher 
(0.04566 or 0.04669 if we include negative tax deductions) indicates a greater 
redistributive effect after the reform. These effects are achieved despite the tax 
revenue being smaller (as showed by a smaller average tax rate after the reform, 
13.1%) because the revenue effect decreases less than the progressivity effect in-
creases, while the re-ranking effect is of very small magnitude.
It can then be concluded that the reform of 2015, although it implies less revenue, 
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324 Table 7 
Effects on redistribution, progressivity and revenue of PIT in 2016
results 2016 Income net of tax final net income
Gini (pre-tax income) 0.42343 0.42343
Gini (after-tax income) 0.37776 0.37674
reynolds-smolensky 0.04566 0.04669
Concentration index (tax) 0.71930 0.73863
Concentration index (after-tax income) 0.37709 0.37577
reranking effect 0.00067 0.00097
Effective average tax rate (t) 0.13540 0.13134
Revenue effect [t/(1-t)] 0.15661 0.15120
Kakwani index 0.29588 0.31520
Note: The values that have been used to obtain the Reynolds-Smolensky index have been given 
in bold.
Source: Authors’ calculation using PIT microsimulation tool developed at the IEF.
Although the results are not included here because they are very extensive, the 
contribution to progressivity and the redistributive effect of the different modifica-
tions undertaken in the reform were also calculated in an individualized way. The 
changes in the tax schedule, in the personal and family minimum amounts, in the 
tax credits, and in the negative deductions, were separated. Each group of changes 
was considered as if each of them was the only modification of the reform, and the 
base and the tax amounts were compared before and after the modifications were 
introduced.
When the parts of the reform are analysed individually, all of them can be seen to 
contribute positively to redistribution and progressivity, although in different 
ways. For example, negative tax credits are the most progressive measure of all 
those analyzed separately, but their low impact on tax collection makes the final 
effect on redistribution the lowest of all the measures considered. For this reason 
it is interesting to analyze progressivity and the redistribution separately, taking 
into account that a very progressive measure (but not applied extensively, and 
therefore with little collection impact), can generate a small effect on the final re-
distribution. As an inverse example there is the effect of the tax schedule, which, 
with a Kakwani index of half that obtained by negative tax credits, has finally al-
most twice the redistribution effect, due to the impact on the collection.
Turning to the global results, we calculate the absolute and percentage change of 
the reform on redistribution (measured by Reynolds-Smolensky index), revenue 
capacity (measured by the average tax rate) and progressivity (measured by Kak-
wani index) in table 8. Results are separated depending on whether negative tax 
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325Table 8
Absolute and percentage changes in Reynolds-Smolensky index, average tax rate 
and Kakwani index before and after the reform 









Smolensky 0.04345 0.04566  0.00222  5.1 0.04390 0.04669  0.00278  6.3
Average 
tax rate 0.13901 0.13540 -0.00361 -2.6 0.13738 0.13134 -0.00604 -4.4
Kakwani 0.27374 0.29588  0.02214  8.1 0.28101 0.31520  0.03419   12.2
Source: Authors’ calculation using PIT microsimulation tool developed at the IEF.
After comparing the situation before and after the reform it can be concluded that 
the rules applicable in 2016 reduce the inequality in the distribution of income to a 
greater extent than the norm of 2011. This effect is achieved even though the pres-
sure exerted on taxpayers is lower (note that the reduction in the average effective 
rate of 2.6 percentage points when negative taxes are not included or 4.4 percentage 
points when they are computed). Taking into account this decrease in the tax collec-
tion effect, the improvement in redistribution is mainly explained by the greater 
progressivity associated with the reform (which is 8.1% higher in 2016 than in 2011 
if negative taxes are not included, and 12.2% if they are). The tax reform in the 
Spanish PIT improves the redistribution of income by 6.3% despite revenue falls by 
2,800€ million thanks to an increase of the progressivity of 12.2 percentage points.
5 effects of tHe reforM on PoVertY
The last of the analyzed effects of the reform of 2015 is a change of monetary pov-
erty. It should be taken into account that the part of the income distribution that we 
focus on for poverty analysis is the left tail, which includes the lowest incomes. 
Many of the households here are not required to file for income tax, so it is more 
convenient to use the Survey of Living Conditions instead of the sample of income 
tax payers (the administrative data used in the analysis performed in section 4).
The poverty measurement has been obtained using EUROMOD (version G3.0) 
(Sutherland and Figari, 2013), a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the Euro-
pean Union, which is already pre-programmed and includes a more suitable data 
base for this purpose (EU_SILC 2012). It should be pointed out that not all the 
changes operated by the reform of the PIT can be included. We include all those 
for which information is available both separating the changes and also consider-
ing all the modifications together. We will refer to the changes analyzed by the 
following nomenclature:
C1 = Modification of labour income reduction
C2 = Changes in tax schedule
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326 C4 = Tax credits for large and single-parent families
C5 = Negative taxes for disabled descendants
RT = Total reform = Combination of C1, C2, C3, C4 and C5.
The calculated poverty indices are the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) using pa-
rameter 0 for measuring the incidence, parameter 1 for including the intensity, and 
parameter 2 in order to introduce the inequality consideration. The FGT indices 
are obtained for a poverty line of 60% of median income.
Table 9




reform c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
FGT(0) 21.31 20.94 21.27 21.21 21.25 21.12 21.24
FGT(1)  7.96  7.82  7.96  7.95  7.96  7.84  7.95
FGT(2)  4.85  4.77  4.85  4.85  4.85  4.78  4.84
Source: Authors’ calculation using EUROMOD.
The results must be interpreted in the following way: before the reform, there was 
21.31% incidence of poverty, which decreases to 20.94% if all changes from C1 
to C5 (RT) are considered. Every change individually evaluated makes the per-
centage of poverty reduce, and the most effective measure in reducing the inci-
dence is C4 (tax credits for large and single-parent families) which would on its 
own drive the incidence of poverty down to 21.12%). The overall effect does not 
derive from the addition of the effects individually considered. Intensity is also 
reduced for every measure, but as we use higher parameters for calculation of 
FGT indices, the changes are smaller and not visible at the hundredth level.
All measures analyzed are poverty reducers. When the analyses are done indi-
vidually the effect may be very small (the effect may not appear to be in the sec-
ond decimal place), but poverty is reduced in any case, and in all its dimensions. 
It is convenient to assure the robustness of this result by checking if it is main-
tained for different poverty lines, as presented in table 10. The poverty lines (first 
column) are expressed in monthly amounts in euros.
For any of the poverty lines considered, it can be concluded that the reform re-
duces poverty in all its dimensions. Raising the poverty line involves the measure-
ment of more poor people and a greater intensity. But whatever the situation of 
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327Table 10





















103 0.1 2.5  2.45  1.84  1.82 1.71 1.69
206 0.2  3.95  3.90  2.52  2.47 2.08 2.05
309 0.3  6.39  6.23  3.36  3.29 2.56 2.51
413 0.4  9.86  9.49  4.52  4.41 3.17 3.12
516 0.5 14.22 13.97  6.02  5.86 3.92 3.83
619 0.6 21.31 20.94  7.96  7.82 4.85 4.77
722 0.7 28.68 28.30 10.35 10.11 5.99 5.85
825 0.8 35.41 34.83 13.06 12.79 7.33 7.16
928 0.9 42.86 42.30 15.96 15.65 8.84 8.65
Source: Authors’ calculation using EUROMOD.
6 concludInG reMarKs
The Spanish Personal Income Tax reform seems to have generated good results in 
terms of liquidity, redistribution, progressivity and poverty reduction.
The liquidity increases in any case, for all levels of income, regardless of family 
circumstances, and for both the individual and the joint declaration options. Be-
sides, the percentage increase in disposable income is always greater the lower the 
level of income, with a progressive effect on the distribution of liquidity. 
The redistributive and progressivity analysis has been conducted by using micro-
simulation tools developed in the IEF. From the results achieved in terms of dis-
tribution, a clear conclusion is obtained: the tax reform has brought about a posi-
tive redistributive effect among taxpayers since it reduces the inequality that, in 
terms of income, exists before and after payment of the tax. In particular, the 
analysis points out that the applicable legislation in 2016 is almost 6.3% more 
redistributive than the applicable legislation in 2011, measured by the Reynolds-
Smolensky index. This is a remarkable circumstance since this redistribution has 
been achieved through the lowering of this progressive tax, specifically 2.87€ 
million less than the tax revenue if the 2011 legislation was applied. The legisla-
tion in 2016 results, in terms of progressivity and measured by Kakwani index, a 
12.2% higher than that from the application of 2011 legislation. 
The poverty analysis carried out using EUROMOD lets us conclude that regard-
less of the poverty line considered, the tax reform cuts poverty in all its key di-
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328 aPPendIX
This appendix outlines the main changes in the regulations for the Spanish PIT 
reform of 2015.
a1 taX scHedule
The minimum threshold of taxation is raised after the 2015 reform. The amount of 
income from which a worker is considered a taxpayer is 12,000€ per year. Spanish 
Fiscal Federalism rules allow some capacity of modification of the tax schedule 
for the different regions. As the research was conducted, and before actual data 
were available (which are being generated in 2017), it was simulated that all re-
gions maintained the same rate as the central government. The real effect of the 
tax schedule on taxpayers will depend on the decisions that the Autonomous Com-
munities take with respect to their proportion of the tax schedule. This change 
may be evaluated when the data for the 2016 statements are available.
Table a1 
Global tax schedule in 2015 and 2016 (sum of state and autonomous schedules)
Amount of tax base (euro) 2015 rates (%) 2016 rates (%)
Up to 12,450 20 19
12,450 – 20,200 25 24
20,200 – 34,000 31 30
34,000 – 60,000 39 37
More than 60,000 47 45
Previously to the reform in 2014 there was a distribution of rent by tranches dif-
ferent from that existing after the reform.
Table a2
Global tax schedule in 2014 (sum of state and autonomous schedules)
Amount of tax base (euro) 2014 rates (%)
Up to 17,707.20 24.75
17,707.20 – 33,007.20 30
33,007.20 – 53,407.20 40
53,407.20 – 120,000.20 47
120,000.20 – 175,000.20 49
175,000.20 – 300,000.20 51
More than 300,000.20 52
a2 WItHHoldInG taX
We consider that both the withholding system and the autonomous part of the tax 
schedule take the state as a reference. Withholding rates have also experienced 
declines following reform that could mean a decrease of five percentage points in 
the rate. The main measures regarding withholdings have been:
 – Reduced rate of 19% for managers whose remuneration comes from entities 
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329 – Also reduced is the rate of retention applicable to professionals: 18% in 
general and 15% or 9% under certain circumstances.
a3 deductIble eXPenses froM labour IncoMe
Along with the elimination of a deduction of up to 400€ for taxpayers with in-
comes lower than 12,000€, the reform has increased the amount applicable as a 
reduction of the full income of the work that operates for taxpayers with lower 
incomes. This increase implies in practice an increase in the reduction from 4,040€ 
to 5,700€ to taxpayers with net income from work below 11,250€. The considera-
tion of deductible expenses from labour income decreases as labour income in-
creases.
a4 saVInG IncoMe
All profits and losses derived from transmissions, irrespective of their generation 
period, are considered as savings income after the reform. It is a way of favouring 
the neutrality of investment decisions by ceasing to depend on the taxation of 
generation time. As a consequence of the incorporation to the base of the savings 
of all the gains or losses which derive from transactions of assets the compensa-
tion conditions are softened. 
The types of tax applicable to savings income before and after the reform are 
showed in table A3.
Table a3 
Tax rates applicable to saving incomes in 2014, 2015 and 2016 
amount of tax 
base (euro)
tax rate 2014 
(%)
amount of tax 
base (euro)
tax rate 2015 
(%)
tax rate 2016 
(%)
Up to 6,000 21 Up to 6,000 20 19





a5 IncoMe froM caPItal
a5.1 dIVIdends
The main novelty of the reform is the abolition of the existing exemption of divi-
dends and participation in profits with the limit of 1,500€ per year. Alongside this 
idea of  greater uniformity in the treatment of savings income, it should also be 
borne in mind that this mechanism, initially set up as a corrector for economic 
double taxation, did not fulfil the purpose for which it was intended: minority 
stakes could be corrected by a much higher amount than the underlying corporate 
tax theoretically incorporated into the dividend, while the opposite would occur if 
the share was greater.
It was a “compensatory” measure, which allowed a peaceful transition between 
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330 system which, in line with what happens in almost all European jurisdictions, does 
not carry out such correction.
As a result of the abolition of the exemption, all dividends are taxed in accordance 
with the new rates of the savings rate.
a5.2 ProMotInG lonG terM saVInG
In order to encourage long-term savings, the Law provides for the exemption of 
positive capital income from life insurance, deposits and financial contracts 
through the so-called Long-Term Savings Plans (in Spanish: Planes de Ahorro a 
Largo Plazo, PALP), provided that the taxpayer does not make any disposition of 
the capital resulting from the plan before the end of the period of five years from 
its opening.
The main characteristics of the PALP are the following:
 – The resources contributed to the PALP must be implemented through the 
so-called Individual Long-Term Life Insurance or an Individual Long-Term 
Savings Account which includes money deposits and certain financial con-
tracts.
 – The contributions to the PALP cannot exceed 5,000€ per year in any of the 
exercises of the Plan.
 – The taxpayer may only hold one PALP at any given time although there is no 
limitation to successive ownership.
 – The disposition of the capital can only be produced by the total amount of 
the Plan.
 – The entity must guarantee the payment of at least 85% of the contributions 
at maturity.
a6 contrIbutIons to retIreMent PensIon Plans 
The limit of deductible contributions to pension plans in the base are reduced from 
10,000€ to 8,000€. This will achieve an approximation of the maximum limit of 
reduction to the average of the contributions made by the taxpayers of the tax and 
also an advance in progressivity (because the reductions operate at the marginal 
rate, and the allowance is greater for those who save more).
The reforms also increase from 2,000€ to 2,500€ per year the maximum limit of 
reduction in the taxable base for contributions to social security systems of which 
the taxpayer’s spouse who does not obtain net income from work or business in an 
amount less than 8,000€ per year. 
A non-tax measure should be emphasized, but it affects the substantive regulation 
of the plans, such as the possibility of being rescued, without cause within ten 
years. This is to avoid one of the biggest reluctances of taxpayers to contract pen-
sion plans and make contributions to them, such as the unavailability of the 
amounts contributed until the retirement age (except exceptional cases) and may 














































































41 (3) 315-333 (2017)
331a7 treatMent of faMIlY unIt
In Spain, the Tax Law takes into consideration the family fundamentally in two 
moments: offering a joint tax regime, on the one hand, and through a system of 
personal and family minimums, on the other.
With the reform new personal and family minimums are set, such as the establish-
ment of new support to families with higher social security charges and that there-
fore require special protection, such as those with more dependent children or 
people with disabilities. 
Table a4 
Amount of personal minima before (2014) and after (2016) the reform, amount in 
euro and percentage change
concept Amount (euro) Variation rate(%)2014 2016
Personal minimum 5,151  5,550  7.75
Minimum per descendant: 
1st child 1,836  2,400 30.72
2nd child 2,040  2,700 32.35
3rd child 3,672  4,000  8.93
More 4,182  4,500  7.06
Age minimum and ascendant < 75 years 918  1,150 25.27
Age minimum and ascendant > 75 years 2,040  2,550 25.00
Disability minimum < 65% 2,316  3,000 29.53
Disability minimum < 65%  
(reduced mobility) 4,632  6,000 29.53
Disability minimum > 65% 9,354 12,000 28.29
Deceased descendant 1,836  2,400 30.72
Deceased ascendant 0  1,150 100
Descendant less than 3 years 2,244  2,800 24.78
The new deductions are established as tax credits which will operate as negative 
taxes. These are “pure” subsidies, as they are applied regardless of the amount of 
the taxpayer’s contribution. In particular:
 – Negative tax for each descendant with disability entitled to apply the mini-
mum per descendant: up to 1,200€/year.
 – Negative tax for each ascendant with disability with right to apply the mini-
mum by ascendancy: up to 1,200€/year.
 – Negative tax for being part of a large family up to 1,200€ per year, or 2,400€ 
per year in the case of large families of special category.
Possibility of charging in advance the new family subsidies favours a considerable 
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332 a8 PatronaGe
The Spanish tax reform has also been characterized by introducing fiscal measures 
that contribute to boost patronage activities. The changes in the PIT are as follows:
 – Increasing from 25 to 30% the percentage of general deduction.
 – Establishment of an increased rate for stable donations 35%.
 – New deduction introduced to enhance micro-patronage. Based on this, a de-
duction of 75% is set for donations of less than 150€ that are made after 
2016. A donation that exceeds this amount will benefit from the other in-
creased rates.
disclosure statement 
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